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It is somewhat of an embarrassment to present a paper on the subject
of industrial organization at a meeting sponsored by the National Bureau
to celebrate its fifty of service to the economics profession, and to
the public at large. That, the National Bureau has had an extraordinary—
and beneficial—impact on our thinking and work in many areas of eco-
nomics is something which cannot be disputed. But, and this is the source
of my embarrassment, the National Bureau has carried out very little
research directly concetned with problems of industrial organization. I
should find it difficult to know how to proceed with this paper were it
not that I believe that, in the future, the National Bureau ought to con-
duct much more research in the field of industrial organization. Indeed,
it is just the kind of which the National Bureau handles in so
masterly a fashion: the 'careful collection of detailed information and its
assembly to reveal the patterns of economic behavior, which seems to me
essential if ever we are to make progress in understanding the forces
which determine the organization of industry. So, if I have very little to
say about the work of the National Bureau in the past, I am hopeful
that what I (and others) have to say on this occasion will result in the
National Bureau's conducting such an extensive program of research
that those of you whop are fortunate enough to attend the centenary
celebrations will hear the National Bureau praised by the speakers for its
achievements in the not of business cycles, but of industrial organ-
ization.
This neglect of industrial organization by the National Bureau is
not a peculiarity of its It is, in large part, a reflection of what has
been happening in economic research generally. Very little work is done
on the subject of industrial organization at the present time, as I see the
subject, since what is cpmmonly dealt with under this heading tells us
almost nothing about the organization of industry. You may remember
the occasion on which Sherlock Holmes drew Dr. Watson's attention60 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
to the "curious incident of the dog in the nighttime." This brought the
comment from Watson: "The dog did nothing in the nighttime." Holmes
then remarked: "That was the curious incident." I could not help recall-
ing this conversation when contemplating the present state of the subject
of industrial organization.
What is curious about the treatment of the problems of industrial
organization in economics is that it does not now exist. We all know
what is meant by the organization of industry. It describes the way in
which the activities undertaken within the economic system are divided
up between firms. As we know, some firms embrace many different
activities; while for others, the range is narrowly circumscribed. Some
firms are large; others, small. Some firms are vertically integrated; others
are not. This is the organization of industry or—as it used to be called—
the structure of industry. What one would expect to learn from a study
of industrial organization would be how industry is organized now, and
how this differs from what it was in earlier periods; what forces were
operative in bringing about this organization of industry, and how these
forces have been changing over time; what the effects would be of pro-
posals to change, through legal action of various kinds, the forms of
industrial organization. Such a subject, solidly buttressed by the kind of
research the National Bureau does so well, would enable us to appraise
the worth of actions, and proposals for action, which have as their aim
a modification of the way in which industry is organized.
This description of the organization of industry, which reflects the
traditional view of the subject, is however almost certainly too narrow a
conception of its scope. Firms are not the only organizations which under-
take economic activities. Apart from associations of various sorts and
nonprofit organizations (which may, however, be regarded as special
kinds of firm), there are also a large number of governmental agencies
which undertake economic activities—many of them of great importance.
Almost all, if not indeed all, of these economic activities of government
—whether it be police protection, garbage collection, the provision of
utility services, education or hospitals—are also provided by firms (or
other analogous institutions). It should surely be part of the task of
studies on industrial organization to describe the economic activities
which are performed by governmental agencies, and to explain why the
carrying out of these economic activities is divided up between private
organizations and governments in the way that it is.'
1Ishould like to refer here to an unpublished paper by Victor Fuchs, "Some
Notes Toward a Theory of the Organization of Production," which examines this
question and makes clear its significance.Industrial Organization 61
Let us now look at how the subject is treated today. I will take as
examples two of the most respected books on the subject:Stigler's
Organization of and Bain's Industrial Organization. Stigler has
this to say in his first chapter: "Let us start this volume on a higher
plane of candor than it will always maintain: there is no such subject as
industrial organization. rrhe courses taught under this heading have for
their purpose the understanding of the structure and behavior of the
industries (goods and producers) of an economy. These courses
deal with the size structure of firms (one or many, 'concentrated' or not),
the causes (above alleconomies of scale) of this size structure, the
effects of concentrationcompetition, the effects of competition upon
prices, investment, innovation, and so on. But this is precisely the con-
tent of economic or resource allocation theory, flow often
given the unfelicitous of microeconomics." As to why there are in-
dustrial organization courses in addition to those on economic theory,
Stigler gives two reasons I The first is that theory courses are very formal
in character and cannotinto studies of the empirical measurement of
cost curves, concentration, and so forth. The second is that theory
courses cannot go into policy questions, particularly antitrust and
regulation; and, as phrases it, "the course on industrial organiza-
tion takes on these
2
Baintells us that his book's general subject is "the organization
and operation of the sector of a capitalist economy." He de-
scribes his approach as "external and behavioristic." He is concerned
with "the environmental within which enterprises operate and in
how they behave in their settings as producers, sellers and buyers." He
gives "major emphasis lo the relative incidence of competitive and
monopolistic tendencies in various industries or markets."What Bain
produces is essentially a special sort of price-theory book, dealing with
such questions as the effects of concentration and the significance of
these supposed effects antitrust policy. Bain suggests that an in-
terest in what the firm does (its internal operations) is in some sense
related to management science, and seems to link this with teaching
how businesses ought to be run,4 although it seems to me that the ques-
tion could be studied without any such aim in mind. Bain's view of the
subject (although not,course, the way he handles it)is not essen-
George J. Stigler, Organizationof Industry,Homewood, Ill., Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1968, p.1.
See Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization, New York, John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1968, p. vii.62 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
tially different from that of Stigler. Essentially, both Stigler and Bain
consider the subject of industrial organization as applied price-theory.
Caves, in his book, American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance,
is even more explicit: "The subject of 'industrial organization' applies
the economist's models of price theory to the industries in the world
around us."
Industrial organization has become the study of the pricing and
output policies of firms, especially in oligopolistic situations(often
called a study of market structure, although it has nothing to do with
how markets function). It has not helped, of course, that there is no
theory of oligopoly or, what comes to the same thing, that there are too
many theories of oligopoly. But leaving this problem aside—and with-
out intending to suggest that the questions tackled are unimportant—it
is clear that modern economists writing on industrial organization have
taken a very narrow view of the scope of their subject.
Now, this was not always the case. If you go to a library, you will
find shelves of books written in the 1920's and 1930's dealing in detail
with the organization of particular industries. And there was a good
deal of more general literature (particularly in the United States) deal-
ing with the problems of what was termed integration, both horizontal
and vertical. For example, there was the study published in 1924 by
Willard Thorp, The Integration of industrial Operations. And in the
Cambridge Economics Series in England, there were such general books
as D. H. Robertson's The Control of industry, and Austin Robinson's
The Structureof Competitive industry.Earlier,ofcourse,there
had been Alfred Marshall's Industry and Trade (from which many
British treatments took their inspiration). These works varied greatly
in their range and treatment, from the discussion of workers' councils
by Robertson to the historical account of industrial development by
Marshall; from the casual empiricism of the English writers to the de-
tailed statistical investigations of Willard Thorp. But they were all
characterized by an interest in how industry was organized, in all its
richness and complexity.
It was certainly works such as these which gave me my view of the
subject of industrial organization. But what was lacking in the literature,
or so I thought, was a theory which would enable us to analyze the
determinants of the organization of industry. It was this situation which
led me to write, in the early 1930's, my paper, "The Nature of the
See Richard Caves, American industry: Structure, industry, Performance,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967, p. 14.Industrial Organization 63
Firm" °—an article much cited and little used. This nonuse is not al-
together surprising, since the problems that the theory was intended to
illuminate have not been of much interest to economists in recent years.
But if we are to tackle the problems of industrial organization seriously,
a theory is needed.
What determines a firm does? To answer this question, it is
necessary to understand why a firm exists at all, since this gives us a
clue as to the direction in which to look in order to uncover what de-
termines what a firm dpes. In my day as a student (and perhaps this is
still true today), the pricing system was presented as an automatic self-
regulating system. InArthur Salter's words: "The normal economic
system works: itself." 'The allocation of resources was coordinated by
the pricing system. as simply as this, it seemed to me then, and it
still does, that this description does not fit at all what happens within
the firm. A workman des not move from Department Y to Department
X, because the price in X has risen enough relative to the price in Y to
make the move worthwhile for him. He moves from Y to X because he
is ordered to do so.
As D. H. Robertson picturesquely put it, we find "islands of con-
scious power in this ocean of unconscious cooperation like lumps of
butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk." Outside the firm, price de-
termines the allocation 5f resources, and their use is coordinated through
a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within the firm, these
market transactions are eliminated, and the allocation of resources be-
comes the result of ah administrative decision. Why does the firm
assume the burden of the costs of establishing and running this ad-
ministrative structure, vyhen the allocation of resources could be left to
the pricing system? The main reason for this occurring is that there are
costs that have to be in using the market, and these costs can
be avoided by the usean administrative structure. If transactions are
carried out through there are the costs of discovering what
the relevant prices are; there are the costs of negotiating and completing
a separate contracteach market transaction; and there are other
costs, besides. Of course, the firm is attached to the market, and all con-
tracting is not But the owner of a factor of production does
not have to make a series of contracts with the owners of the other
factors of production whom he is cooperating within the firm.
8Economica,New Series, 386 (1937). Reprinted in Readings in Price Theory,
331 (1952).64 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
The source of the gain from having a firm is that the operation of a
market costs something, and that by forming an organization and allow-
ing the allocation of resources to be determined administratively, these
costs are saved. But, of course, the firm has to carry out its task at a
lower cost than the cost of carrying out the market transactionsit
supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the market if the
firm fails to do so. And, of course, for the individual firm, the alternative
is some other firm which can take over the task if its costs are lower.
The way in which industry is organized is thus dependent on the
relation between the costs of carrying out transactions on the market
and the costs of organizing the same operations within that firm which
can perform this task at the lowest cost. Furthermore, the costs of or-
ganizing an activity within any given firm depends on what other
activities it is engaged in. A given set of activities will facilitate the
carrying out of some activities, but hinder the performance of others.
Itisthese relationships which determine the actual organization of
industry. But having said this, how far ahead are we? We know very
little about the cost of conducting transactions on the market or what
they depend on; we know next to nothing about the effects on costs of
different groupings of activities within firms. About all we know is that
the working out of these interrelationships leads to a situation in which
viable organizations are small in relation to the economic system of
which they are a part.
We are, in fact, appallingly ignorant about the forces which de-
termine the organization of industry. We do, it is true, have some idea
of why it is that an increase in the activities organized within the firm
tends to produce strains within the administrative structure which raise
the costs of organizing additional operations (even if similar to those
already undertaken): the rise in cost occurs both because the admin-
istrative costs themselves rise, and because those making decisions make
more mistakes and fail to allocate resources wisely. This is, more or less,
the conventional treatment of the management problem in economics.7
But as firms expand their functions, it seems to me that they are likely
to embrace activities which are more widely scattered geographically,
and which are, in other ways, more diverse in character. This, I think,
must play its part in limiting the expansion of the firm. This is, in fact, a
special case of the effect on costs of the combining of different activities
See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Control and Business Behavior, Chap-
ter 2, "Internal Organization and Limits to Firm Size," Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, pp. 14—40.Industrial Organization 65
withina single firm—not all of which will be adverse. But the existence
of such interrelationships suggests that an efficient distributio.n of activ-
ities between firms would involve particular (and different) groupings
of activities within the firms (which is, indeed, what we observe). We
would not expect firms to be similar in the range of activities that they
embrace; but, so far as I am aware, the distribution of activities between
firms is not something on which we have much to say.
Why is it that we seem to have so little to say? In part, it can be
explained by the character of the economic analysis which apparently
deals with the organization of industry—by which I mean the treatment
of the optimum size of the firm and of economies of scale. This analysis,
which sounds as if it iè dealing with the organization of industry (al-
though it does not), to reassure those who might be worried by a
more conspicuous gap. It is not difficult to see what is wrong with the
theory of the optimum size of firm, as presented in economics. First of
all, what is wanted is not a statement about the optimum size of the firm
(presumably with a different optimum for each industry), but a theory
which concerns itself With the optimum distribution of activities, or
functions, between Second, the theory of the optimum size of the
firm is not about the size of the firm, in the sense of dealing with the
activities carried outthe firm, but is concerned with the determina-
tion of the size of its output. Moreover, even here, current theory is only
concerned with the output of particular products, or a generalized prod-
uct, and not with the of products produced by the firm. This last
statement is somewhat overbold, since economists may also use value
of assets or number of employees to measure the size of the firm—but I
am, at any rate, saying that there is very little discussion about
what firms actually
The discussion of economies of scale is largely concerned with the
relation of costs to output (the derivation, in effect, of the cost schedule).
Such discussion tells us nothing about the effect on costs of conduct-
ing one activity, of undertaking another activity, or about the relative
costs to different kinds of firms of undertaking particular activities. Still
less does it deal with the extent to which there is "contracting out" as
the output of a (or generalized product) is increased. What has
happened is that the character of the analysis in which economists have
engaged has not seemed to demand an answer to the questions I have
been raising.
I would not, however, wish to omit mention of the one paper
which does attempt to deal with these questions, namely, Professor66 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
Stigler's article, "The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of
the Market." 8Aswe all know, this statement of Adam Smith's, al-
though correct (all of Adam Smith's statements are correct), has caused
some perplexity, since it did not seem to be consistent with the existence
of competitive conditions. In the course of resolving this problem, Pro-
fessor Stigler discusses the conditions which lead to the emergence of
specialized firms, and which influence the extent of vertical integration.
Professor Stigler does not take us very far, but he takes us as far as we
have gone.
I have said that the character of the analysis used by economists
has tended to conceal the fact that certain problems in industrial or-
ganization are not being tackled. But I think there is a much more im-
portant reason for this neglect: interest in industrial organization has
tended to be associated with the study of monopoly, the control of
monopoly, and antitrust policy. This is not a recent development. When
in the late nineteenth century, economists came to be interested in prob-
lems of industrial organization, they were confronted with the problem
of the trust in the United States and the cartel in Germany. It was,
therefore, natural that with the development of antitrust policy in the
United States, interest in antitrust aspects of industrial organization
came to dominate the subject.
This has had its good and its bad effects but, in my opinion, the
bad by far outweigh the good. It has, no doubt, raised the morale of
many scholars working on problems of industrial organization, because
they feel that they are engaged on work which has important policy
implications. It has had the salutary result of focusing these scholars'
attention on real problems concerning the way in which the economic
system operates. It has also led them to utilize some sources of informa-
tion which might otherwise have been neglected. Still, in other respects,
the effects seem to me to have been unfortunate. The desire to be of
service to one's fellows is, no doubt, a noble motive, but it is not possible
to influence policy if you do not give an answer. It has therefore en-
couraged men to become economic statesmen—men, that is, who pro-
vide answers even when there are no answers. This tendency has dis-
couraged a critical questioning of the data and of the worth of the
analysis, leading the many able scholars in this field to tolerate standards
of evidence and analysis which, I believe, they would otherwise have
rejected. This association with policy—and antitrust policy in particular
8SeeGeorge J. Stigler, footnote 2 above, pp. 129—141.Industrial Organization 67
—gave a directionto the study of industrial organization which
prevented certain questidns from being raised or, at any rate, made
it more difficult to do so. The facts as stated in antitrust cases were
accepted as correct(or substantially so). The ways in which the
problem was viewed b)' the lawyers (judges and advocates) were ac-
cepted as the ways in we should approach the problem. The
opinions of the judges often became the starting point of the analysis,
and an attempt was to make sense of what they had said. This so
tangled the discussion that most economists were, apparently, unaware
of having failed. It is that this is beginning to change, as a result
of the work of, among others, Adelman and McGee,° but the dominant
approach is still, I as I have stated it.
One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly prob-
lem is that if an economist finds something—a business practice of one
sort or other—that he çloes not understand, he looks for a monopoly
explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of
ununderstandable practièes tends to be rather large, and the reliance on
a monopoly explanation, frequent. Of course, more recently, the desire
to reduce the burdentaxes has become another way of explaining
why businesses adoptpractices they do. In fact, the situation is such
that if we ever achieved a system of limited government (and, therefore,
low taxation) and the economic system were clearly seen to be com-
petitive, we would have no explanation at all for the way in which the
activities performed in the economic system are divided between firms.
We would be unable to explain why General Motors was not a dominant
factor in the coal industry, or why A & P did not manufacture airplanes.
May I give an taken from a recent article in the Journal
of Law and Economics? The article is by Professor John L. Peterman,
"The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures." 10Procterand
Gamble acquired Clorox and the merger was challenged under the anti-
trust laws. A large part of the case against Procter and Gamble was that
they were able to obtain for television advertising of the order
of 25 to 30 per cent—ciiscounts which were not available to smaller
firms. This led many to the conclusion that this was a manifestation of
monopoly in the television industry and an example of price discrimina-
See, for example, Morris A. Adelman, "The A and P Case: A Study in
Applied Economic Theory," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May, 1949), and
John S. McGee, "Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case," Journal
of Law and Economics (October, 1958).
10lournal of Law and Economics (October, 1968), pp. 321—422.68 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
tion. However, a careful study by Professor Peterman showed that the
discount structure was, in fact, designed to compensate for the fact that
those who purchased advertising time in the way that Procter and Gam-
ble did, obtained, on the average, worse time (time with a smaller
audience). In fact, if the amounts paid were related not to time but to
the audience size, the advantages which Procter and Gamble were alleged
to have, disappeared.
This is, I think, a common situation. There is some unusual feature
—in this case, large discounts. The conclusion is immediately drawn:
monopoly. What people do not normally do is inquire whether it may
not be the case that the practice in question is a necessary element in
bringing about a competitive situation. If this were done, I suspect that
a good deal of supposed monopoly would disappear, and competitive
conditions would be seen to be more common than is now generally
believed. In a similar fashion, vertical integration (let us say, a manu-
facturer acquiring retail outlets)is often thought of as foreclosure, a
means of keeping out other manufacturers, rather than as a possibly
more efficient method of distribution. Similarly, mergers tend to be
thought of as methods of obtaining monopoly, or are related to the busi-
ness cycle, and the possibility that they may bring economies, although
not ignored, tends to receive less attention.
I have given instances of the way in which the association of the
study of industrial organization with antitrust policy has created a dis-
position to search for monopolistic explanations for all business prac-
tices whose justification is not obvious to the meanest intelligence. But,
surely, you will ask, economists have not confined themselves to the
role of camp followers to the judges and the antitrust lawyers in the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The answer
is that they have not so confined themselves—but itis questionable
whether what else they have done has been more useful. During the last
twenty years, a major preoccupation of economists working in what is
called industrial organization has been the study of concentration in
particular industries and its effects. The effects they looked for were
monopolistic, and the way they expected them to be manifested was in
higher profits. As it seems to me (and I must confess that this is not a
field with which I have great familiarity), the results obtained flattered
only to deceive. There was a relationship between concentration and
profitability, weak it is true, but, we are told, statistically significant. On
theoretical grounds, it was rather puzzling. If the elasticity of supply to
the industry was high, or the elasticity of demand for its products wasIndustrial Organization 69
high, one would not expect any relation between concentration and
profitability. And if of producers is supposed to bring greater
profits as a result of collusion, there are many factors other than few-
ness of numbers which affect the likelihood of successful collusion. So, it
was rather strange th'at there was any detectable relationship atall.
There were other features of the results, such as that the rela-
tionship became worse, the more sharply defined the industry. But, per-
haps, we should cease worrying over the significance of these concentra-
tion studies. I say this because of an article entitled "The Antitrust
Task Force Recommendation," which has recently ap-
peared. (It is a critique of a proposal which took the conclusion of these
studies seriously and tried to do something about it.)The author,
Professor Brozen, claims that the results achieved in these concentration
studies reflect disequilibrium conditions in the periods in which the
studies were made. If the calculations are reworked for later periods,
high profit rates tend to rise. if the results
reported by hold up after the criticism to which they
inevitably (and rightly) will be exposed, there can, I think, be little
doubt that this article brings an era to an end. The study of concentra-
tion and its effects will be in shambles. Should this really turn out to be
the position, the may well be a good time to pick up the pieces
and start again.12 That some rethinking of our theory is called for seems
to me clear. But just as important, at the present stage, would be the
gathering in a systematic way of new data on the organization of indus-
try so that we can be better aware of what it is that we must explain.
I should now to return to the undertaking of economic activities
by organizations other than firms and, particularly, by governmental or-
ganizations. Somewhat surprisingly, thisis not a subject with which
economists have been1 much concerned. Insofar as they have considered
this topic, it was as part of a discussion of what the government ought
to do, whether by regulation, or operation, to improve the
working of the economic system; of these three policies, the least atten-
tion has been given to' government operation. In any case, the discussion
had two weaknesses. First, no serious investigation was made of how
11 Journal of Law and Economics (October, 1970), Pp. 279—292.
12 It has been to me that the lack of any significant relationship
between concentration profitability does not imply that there may be a
significant relationship concentration and other aspects of industrial or-
ganization. This may well be true. However, I doubt whether we will understand
the reasons for these relationships until we make a direct attack on the problem.70 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
the policies advocated would work out in practice. To justify govern-
ment action, it was enough to show that the "market"—or perhaps more
accurately, private enterprise—failed to achieve the optimum. That the
results of the government action proposed might also fall short of the
optimum was little explored, and in consequence, the conclusions reached
have little value for appraising public policy.
The discussion, however, has a further weakness which is more
relevant to my main theme here. It seems to have been implicitly assumed
that the same considerations which led welfare economists to see the
need for govenment action would also motivate those whose active sup-
port was required to bring about the political changes necessary to
implement these policy recommendations. In this, we are wiser than we
were, in large part because of the new "economic theory of politics."
We are beginning to perceive the nature of the forces which bring about
changes in the law—and there is no necessary relationship between the
strength of forces favoring such changes and the gain from such changes
as seen by econOmists. It suggests that economists interested in promot-
ing particular economic policies should investigate the framework of our
political system to discover what modifications in it are required if their
economic policies are to be adopted, and should count in the cost of
these political changes. This presupposes that the relationship between
the character of the political institutions and the adoption of a particular
economic policy—in our case, government operation of industry—has
been discovered. We do not know much about these relationships, but
uncovering them seems to me a task to be assumed by students of indus-
trial organization. It is easy to observe that the extent of government
participation in industry has varied over time, has varied between indus-
tries, and has varied between various geographical areas. I have no
doubt that as a result of research on this aspect of industrial organiza-
tion, the factors which have contributed to these differences will be un-
covered. It is my hope that the National Bureau will participate in this
work.
I have suggested that what is wanted is a large-scale systematic
study of the organization of industry in the United States. I have also
suggested that this would yield best results if conducted in an atmosphere
in which the scientific spirit is not contaminated by a desire (or felt
obligation) to find quick solutions to difficult policy issues. Where else
could such conditions of scientific purity be found than in the National
Bureau? This proposal for more research is founded on my belief that
itis unlikely that we shall see significant advances in our theory ofIndustrial Organization 71
the organization of industry until we know more about what it is that
we must explain. An inspired theoretician might do as well without such
empirical work, but my own feeling is that the inspiration is most likely
to come through the stimulus provided by the patterns, puzzles, and
anomalies revealed by systematic data-gathering, particularly when the
prime need is to break our existing habits of thought.
I said that the National Bureau had done very little in the field of
industrial But the subject has not been completely ignored
and, as Professor Stigler has indicated (no doubt correctly), there is
much to be learnt about industrial organization in National Bureau
studies on finance, and technological advances.'3 But there are
works sponsored by the National Bureau which deal squarely with in-
dustrial organization, ¶mnd I should say something about them. That they
are works of high schplarship, dealing with topics of great importance,
is not in dispute; but, given the present state of the discipline, it is hardly
surprising that these works should have ignored, or touched only lightly
upon, certain issues, or that the treatment was, in other respects, incom-
plete.
The chief published by the National Bureau on industrial
organization would seem to be: Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Gov-
ernmentActivity in United States Since 1900; Ralph L. Nelson,
Merger Movements in American Industry; and Michael Gort, Diversifica-
tion and Integration in A merican Industry.
I will first say something about Professor Fabricant's work, since it
deals with activity, an aspect of industrial organization which
seems to me to have been somewhat neglected. This book does not con-
fine itself to questions pf public finance or regulation, which is important,
revealing as it does an interest on the part of the National Bureau in
the role of government as an organizer of economic activity. The dis-
cussion is, however, largely concerned with analyzing the composition
of government employment and expenditures, with relating these to the
totals for the as a whole, with discovering trends in the aggre-
gates, and with similar questions. Of itself, the study does not throw
much light on the factors which cause the government to operate eco-
nomic enterprises, buç it does provide a good deal of data which would
be useful in an investigation which had this as its aim. I would hope that
in some future study, the National Bureau will collect detailed informa-
SeeGeorge J. Stigler,. Foreword to Michael Gort's book, Diversification and
Integration in New York, National Bureau of Economic Re-
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tion about government operations in such a form that, as a result of
analysis, we will discover the factors which cause government operation
to be chosen as against other methods of economic organization. In this
connection, I would hope that the National Bureau makes a study of
government contracting, since the question at issue is not simply one of
government versus private enterprise, but also of government operation
versus "contracting out" for products and services which the govern-
ment itself demands.
Next, let us consider the books of Professors Nelson and Gort,
which deal with problems of industrial organization of a more traditional
kind. Professor Nelson's impressive work is mainly concerned with the
development of time series for mergers in the United States; with relat-
ing merger movements to business cycles; and with testing, insofar as his
data allow this, the main explanations advanced to account for the
variations in merger activity. Professor Nelson does not give many de-
tails of the kind of organization created by the mergers (the kind of
activities that were brought together within the same organization), nor
does he deal with what happened after the merger was consummated.
As a consequence, we are not able to judge what the role of the various
merger movements was in shaping the industrial structure of the United
States, or how far they were a response to fundamental changes which
required such modifications in organization to promote efficiency. All
this, I may add, is recognized by Professor Nelson, who concludes:
"The important and interesting job of producing answers remains to be
done." 14
Ofthe three works that I have mentioned, that by Professor Gort
comes closest to what I have in mind when I speak of the research on
industrial organization that we need today. Professor Gort does deal
with the question of the range of activities organized within the firm, and
there can be few problems of importance in industrial organization on
which he does not touch. However, Professor Gort abandoned the more
straightforward methods of earlier investigators, such as Willard Thorp.
He makes the central theme of his book a study of diversification. He
measures trends in diversification, and seeks to discover the economic
characteristics of diversifying firms, and of the industries entered by
diversifying firms. Degrees of diversification are not, however, easy to
define or to measure, and the results which Professor Gort presents are
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difficult to interpret without knowledge of the underlying industrial struc-
ture. An approach to the organization of industry via a study of diversi-
fication is not without interest, but it presents a strange first step. It is as
if we started an investigation of eating habits by measuring the degree of
diversification in the foods consumed by each individual, rather than by
discovering what the patterns of food consumption actually are.
In my view, what is wanted in industrial organization is a direct
approach to the problem. This would concentrate on what activities
firms undertake, and would endeavor to discover the characteristics of
the groupings of activities within firms. Which activities tend to be asso-
ciated and which do not? The answer may well differ for different kinds
of firm; for example,firms of different size, or for those with a differ-
ent corporate structure, or for firms in different industries. It is not possi-
ble to forecast what prove to be of importance before such an in-
vestigation is carried Out; which is, of course, why it is needed. In addi-
tion to studying what happens within firms, studies should also be made
of the contractual arrangements between firms (long-term contracts,
leasing, licensing arrangements of various kinds including franchising,
and so on), since arrangements are the alternative to organization
within the firm. The study of mergers should be extended so that it be-
comes an integral of the main subject. In addition to a study of the
effects of the rearrangement of functions between firms through mergers,
we also ought to into account "dismergers" (the breaking up of
firms); the transferdepartments or divisions between firms; the tak-
ing on of new activities and the abandonment of old activities; and also
—which tends to be emergence of new firms.
Studies such as those I have just outlined would bring under re-
view the whole of the organization of industry in the United States, and
would put us in a position to start the long and difficult task of discover-
ing what the forces are which shape it. It is my hope that the National
Bureau will play a major role in bringing about this renaissance in the
study of industrial organization.